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Abstract—The surging global mobile data traffic challenges the
economic viability of cellular networks and calls for innovative
solutions to reduce the network congestion and improve user
experience. In this context, user-provided networks (UPNs),
where mobile users share their Internet access by exploiting
their diverse network resources and needs, turn out to be
very promising. Heterogeneous users with advanced handheld
devices can form connections in a distributed fashion and unleash
dormant network resources at the network edge. However, the
success of such services heavily depends on users’ willingness to
contribute their resources, such as network access and device
battery energy. In this paper, we introduce a general framework
for UPN services and design a bargaining-based distributed
incentive mechanism to ensure users’ participation. The proposed
mechanism determines the resources that each user should
contribute in order to maximize the aggregate data rate in
UPN, and fairly allocate the benefit among the users. The
numerical results verify that the service can always improve
users’ performance, and such improvement increases with the
diversity of the users’ resources. Quantitatively, it can reach an
average 30% increase of the total served traffic for a typical
scenario even with only 6 mobile users.
Index Terms—Network Economics, Network Optimization,
Nash Bargaining, Fog Computing, User-Provided Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
According to several recent industry reports [2], [3], mobile
data is expected to increase with an annual growth rate of 60%
in the next several years, reaching 25 exabytes per month in
2020. This surging traffic places an unprecedented strain on
cellular networks, which need to substantially expand their
capacities. However, it is clear that the traditional capacity
increase strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs), such
as acquiring more spectrum or deploying additional network
infrastructure, are often time-consuming, costly, and eventually
inadequate to accommodate the traffic growth. Therefore,
MNOs often end up offering services of low quality [4], or
charging their subscribers very expensive usage-based fees [5].
This means that a large number of mobile users do not have
access to the low-cost and high-speed mobile Internet, and
hence there are significant user dissatisfactions and frequent
user churns. This leads to the growing consensus that more
disruptive methods and forward-looking solutions are needed
to resolve the growing gap between data supply and demand.
At the same time, recent technological advancements have
resulted in sophisticated user handheld equipments, such as
smartphones with Wi-Fi (802.11) and Bluetooth (802.15.1)
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Fig. 1. An example of users interactions in UPNs. Each user can concurrently
consume data from multiple gateways, over multiple and possibly multi-hop
paths, and serve as a relay or even a gateway for others. Left: concurrent
downloading from two gateways. Right: multi-hop connection to Internet.
interfaces, 4G chipsets supporting cellular connections up
to 150Mbps [6], and high-end processors that can execute
complicated networking tasks. However, the conventional ap-
proach of using these devices as simple transceivers, which are
completely controlled by the cellular base stations to serve
only the needs of their owners, does not fully exploit their
communication and computational capabilities. Clearly, these
devices can also offer communication services to nearby users,
by acting as mobile Wi-Fi hotspots or relays. In other words,
it is to transform users to local micro-operators, serving each
other’s needs. This leads to the so-called user-provided net-
works (UPNs) [7], [8], [9], [10] which constitute a promising
solution for alleviating network congestion, reducing network
access costs, and improving the user satisfaction by enabling
network control at the edge of the network.
One of the first UPN services is FON [11], a community-
based Wi-Fi Internet access scheme, where roaming FON
users can access the Internet through the home Wi-Fi connec-
tions of other nearby FON users. Different from FON which
utilizes fixed user equipments (Wi-Fi access points), there is an
emerging trend of mobile UPNs, which focus on leveraging the
capabilities of handheld mobile devices [12], [13], [14]. For
example, Open Garden [13] offers a mobile software which
enables mobile devices to connect with each other through
Wi-Fi direct [15] or Bluetooth [16], and share their Internet
connections. This solution creates a mesh network, where each
user (device) may act as a client node (consuming data), a
relay (relaying data to other nodes), or a gateway (connecting
the mesh overlay with Internet), as illustrated in Figure 1.
In a nutshell, mobile UPN services aim to crowdsource
Internet access by allowing users to collaboratively consume
their Internet connections and battery energy. The key idea is
to turn the negative externality of network congestion to the
positive network effect, by exploiting the diversity of resources
and demands of different users. Recent measurement-based
studies [17] have revealed the large benefits of these sharing
mechanisms. However, the success of such services heavily
depends on (i) the willingness of users to join the service
and contribute their resources, and (ii) the efficient allocation
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Fig. 2. The proposed service can be used to mitigate interference by proper
channel assignments. In this example, both access points transmit in the same
channel (with a frequency f1), hence close-by users (1 and 2) will interfere
with each other if they directly communicate with the access points (dashed
arrow for user 2). The UPN service can exploit the two NICs of user 3 (who is
further away from user 1) for relaying the traffic of user 2 through a different
channel, thus reducing the interference for user 1.
of the aggregated capacity. Clearly, a user with low battery
energy and fast Internet connection may not be willing to
serve other users, unless this improves her satisfaction level.
Therefore, it is of important to design a resource sharing
mechanism for properly incentivizing user participation.
Such an incentive mechanism (currently missing from [13]
and similar services) should encourage users to collaborate,
and lead to a proper data transmission and routing scheme that
balances efficiency and fairness. The efficiency is quantified in
terms of the aggregate throughput which can be maximized by
having users with the highest Internet connection capacities
serve as gateways, and by properly scheduling the traffic to
avoid heavy interferences among users. The fairness criterion,
on the other hand, concerns the relationship among data
delivery, resource contribution, and economic gains/losses of
each user. If a user experiences excessive unfair consumption
of her resources she will probably leave the service and hence
deteriorate the performance experienced by other users.
Nevertheless, the design of this mechanism is very chal-
lenging. First of all, there is often no central entity controlling
such a wireless mesh network with devices belonging to
heterogeneous physical networks, and each user only has
information regarding her own needs and resources. Therefore,
the proposed scheme has to be distributed. Moreover, the
fairness criterion should consider that users have different
needs and may contribute different resources with different
costs. At the same time, this criterion should take into account
that a user will participate in the service only if she expects
to improve over her standalone performance, i.e., the one she
achieves when acting independently.
B. Methodology and Contributions
We introduce a detailed framework for the UPN service,
which is modeled as a multi-hop, multi-path mesh network that
manages multiple unicast sessions between the Internet and
different users. Each device may have one or more network
interface cards (NICs), which enable it to transmit/receive over
one or more frequency channels. Each user is parameterized
by her Internet connection capacity (through cellular or Wi-
Fi connections), her available battery energy, the monetary
cost for downloading and uploading data (based on the user’s
pricing scheme or data plan), and her relaying capabilities.
Finally, we employ user-specific utility and cost functions to
account for the communication needs and energy consumption
aversion, respectively, that may vary across the users.
We use game theory, and specifically the Nash bargaining
solution (NBS) concept [18], to determine the efficient and fair
contribution of the user resources and allocation of the service
capacity to each user. The NBS yields an outcome which is
Pareto efficient and fair [19], and hence is self-enforcing, i.e.,
acceptable by all users. A particularly important feature of
the NBS rule is that it takes into account the disagreement
performance of each player, i.e., the utility she perceives when
an agreement is not reached. This means that the NBS ensures
that each user participating in the UPN service will receive a
performance at least as good as her standalone performance.
We further introduce a virtual currency system to facilitate
the users’ cooperation and address the inherent incentive issue.
Such a system allows the users to cooperate not only by direct
service exchanges (e.g., relaying data for each other) but also
by using this currency to pay for the services that they receive
(e.g., exchange currency with relayed data). This encourages
users to participate and serve other users so as to collect
currency, even if they currently do not have communication
needs (but can use the currency later when they have needs).
Similarly, it enables users with poor Internet connections to
utilize the service by paying other users. Clearly, this virtual
currency system addresses the problem of double coincidence
of needs [20], therefore increases the number of users who are
able to cooperate with each other.
We propose an algorithm that computes the NBS in a
distributed fashion, thus enabling the decentralized implemen-
tation of the resource sharing mechanism. This is highly non-
trivial mathematically, since the respective optimization prob-
lem has both a coupled constraint set and a coupled objective
function. The obtained solution determines the amount of each
resource (Internet access capacity, wireless bandwidth, and
battery energy) that each user should contribute, the amount of
data that she will be served in return, and the virtual currency
transfers. Moreover, it describes how this will be achieved,
i.e., how much traffic will be conveyed over each link, which
channels will be used for the users’ communications, and
which Internet connections will be utilized. Such a holistic
methodology enables more than two users to collaborate over
multihop paths, and therefore outperforms prior bilateral-only
cooperation schemes. Besides, this joint design and coordina-
tion of the users can mitigate interference among users through
proper channel reallocations, as shown in Figure 2.
Additionally, the proposed service model goes beyond typ-
ical self-organized networks or device-to-device communica-
tions, as it is capable of connecting multiple heterogeneous
Internet access networks. In particular, it can offload cellular
traffic to Wi-Fi networks [21] or onload Wi-Fi traffic to
cellular networks [22]. These scenarios are illustsrated in
Figure 3. The optimal strategy depends on congestion levels
of the Internet connections and the data access costs. More
interestingly, these decisions are made by users in a distributed
fashion and without the intervention of network operators.
To this end, the main technical contributions are as follows:
• Analytical Model: We introduce a general mobile UPN
service that incorporates users’ communication needs,
monetary costs, and energy consumption, which are the
key factors affecting users’ servicing decisions.
• Incentive Provision & Service Allocation Mechanism: We
design a resource sharing mechanism based on the Nash
bargaining solution, that induces users’ participations
through fair allocation of the contributed resources. It is
Pareto efficient and takes into account users’ standalone
performances. These aspects are very crucial to maintain
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a good performance of the service.
• Distributed Algorithm: We propose a distributed algo-
rithm, which combines the concepts of consistency pric-
ing [23] and primal-dual Lagrange relaxation [24], and
achieves the unique NBS. This enables the decentralized
implementation of the service, without requiring central
coordination or additional infrastructure.
• Intelligence-at-the-edge: We discuss how the service can
account for interference and congestion effects, by taking
intelligent (at-the-edge) channel assignment, routing, and
flow control decisions. We explain how the service can
be used both for mobile data offloading and onloading,
adapting on the congestion levels of the different net-
works as well as the Internet access costs.
• Performance Evaluation: We evaluate the performance of
the service for various system parameters and scenarios.
We find that the benefits increase as users become more
heterogeneous (diverse) in terms of their needs and re-
sources, increasing on average by at least 30% the amount
of served data in a typical scenario with 6 users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model. Section III analyzes the user
decisions and provides the problem statement. In Section IV,
we present the Nash bargaining formulation, and in Section
V we provide the algorithm for its distributed solution. We
present numerical results in Section VI. Finally, we analyze
related works in Section VII, and conclude in Section VIII.
II. MODEL
A. Basics of the UPN Model
Network Graph. We consider a set of mobile users I =
{1, 2, . . . , I}, who are interested in providing a crowdsourced
Internet access service (hereafter referred to as service) to each
other for a time period T (e.g., several minutes). The users
create a mesh network that is described by a directed graph
G = (I, E ,B). Here, E denotes the set of communication
links that can carry data between the nodes (or, users), and B
denotes the set of “interference links”. If a link (i, j) ∈ E , then
node i can transmit data to j. If a link (i, j) ∈ B, then nodes i
and j are not in communication range but still their concurrent
transmissions (independent of their transmission destinations)
interfere with each other1. This is possible since in 802.11 the
carrier sense range is larger than the transmission range [25].
We assume that the graph is connected, i.e., any two nodes
can communicate (e.g., for exchanging control messages)
through a (possibly multi-hop) path along the communication
links. We also define the sets
In(i) = {j : (j, i) ∈ E}, Out(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}, (1)
for the upstream and the downstream one-hop neighbors of
node i, respectively. Similarly, we introduce the extended sets
Ine(i) and Oute(i) that include the interference links as well,
e.g., Ine(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E ∪ B}. Finally, we define the set
of neighbors for i, N (i) = In(i) ∪Out(i) and the respective
extended neighbor set N e(i) = Ine(i) ∪Oute(i).
Channels. Each node can access the Internet using multiple
Internet connections simultaneously, for example through both
cellular and Wi-Fi connections. This is consistent with the
1The interference link is based on [25] and is consistent with the typical interference
range approach: an interference link exists among two nodes whenever one is within the
interference range of the other. For simplicity, we assume a symmetric relationship.
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Fig. 3. The proposed service can be used to offload cellular traffic to Wi-
Fi access points (left), or onload Wi-Fi traffic to cellular networks (right).
The offloading decisions depend mainly on the data usage (and energy) cost
incurred by the users, while the onloading decisions depend on the congestion
of Wi-Fi APs. Here the dashed arrow means the data downloading choice
before collaboration, and the solid arrow means the data downloading choice
after collaboration.
recent technology development (e.g., see [27], [28]). Our
model also allows the more restricted case where each gateway
node can only use the best of her multiple Internet connections.
There is a set F of unlicensed channels (Bluetooth or Wi-Fi)
available for each direct link among the users2. For example,
in the IEEE 802.11 family of standards [15], there are 3
orthogonal channels in the 2.4GHz band and 12 channels in
the 5GHz band. Each communication link can utilize any one
(and only one) of these channels f ∈ F at any given time. Note
that set F does not include the licensed cellular channel which
we denote as c. Each node i ∈ I has ki network interface
cards (NICs) which allow the concurrent utilization of up to ki
different channels on ki communication links connected to this
node. This includes the special case of ki = 1, where a node
has only one Wi-FI NIC (besides her capability of accessing
the Internet through the cellular channel c). Similarly to [25],
[26], we assume that the devices can change channels very fast
without significant overheads (e.g., in energy consumption).
Link Capacities and Commodities. We denote with Cci
and Cfi the Internet access capacity for user i ∈ I when
she employs her cellular connection c, or Wi-Fi connection
choosing channel f ∈ F , respectively. Also, let Cfij ≥ 0
denote the capacity of link (i, j) ∈ E when choosing channel
f ∈ F assuming no other interference links are active at
the same time. In general, we allow to have Cf1ij 6= Cf2ij
for f1, f2 ∈ F , so as to take into account possible channel
diversity. We assume that the users are nomadic (not very
fast moving), and the time period length much larger than the
channel coherent time. This means that we can use proper
coding techniques to deal with the fast small scale fading,
therefore the link capacities are considered constant during T .
B. Network Constraints, Routing and Internet Access
In order to simplify the presentation, we will focus on the
scenario where users download data from the Internet. Our
analysis can be easily extended for the uploading scenario with
more complicated notations. During period T , each user can
have more than one roles if needed: she can be a client node
(consuming data), a relay node (routing data to/from other
users), and/or a gateway node (downloading data from the
Internet). Therefore, there exist at most |I| data commodities
in the UPN, where each commodity n ∈ I corresponds to
2Note that the Wi-Fi Internet access channel is determined by the Wi-Fi AP instead
of by users participating in the UPN. Hence, it may or may not coincide with one of the
orthogonal channels in F . For the more general model, we assume that this channel is
one of the elements in set F .
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a (potentially multi-hop) unicast session originating from the
Internet (e.g., a content server) and ending at a user n ∈ I.
Scheduling and Network Constraints. We assume that the
time period T = {1, 2, . . . , T} is divided in T equal length
time slots t = 1, 2, . . . , T , with each slot having a normalized
length of 1. In each slot, every node i ∈ I can potentially
update her strategy and decide whether she is going to use
any of her outgoing links to transmit data, or receive data
from her upstream neighbors, or access the Internet through
the cellular or a Wi-Fi network. If the node has multiple NICs,
she can choose multiple choices at the same time. Namely,
we use the binary variable x̂fij [t] ∈ {0, 1} to denote node
i’s decision of whether transmitting data (of any commodity)
to node j ∈ Out(i) during slot t in channel f . We further
use binary variables ŷci [t] ∈ {0, 1} and ŷfi [t] ∈ {0, 1} to
denote user i’s decisions of whether downloading data from
the Internet during t, through the cellular connection or the
Wi-Fi channel f ∈ F , respectively.
These decisions are subject to certain constraints. The first
condition that should be satisfied is the link-channel constraint:
for each link (i, j) ∈ E and each Wi-Fi Internet link, only one
channel can be employed in each slot t at most, i.e.,∑
f∈F
x̂fij [t] ≤ 1, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E , ∀ t ∈ T , (2)∑
f∈F
ŷfi [t] ≤ 1, ∀ i ∈ I,∀ t ∈ T . (3)
Second, the data amounts that each node i ∈ I can send
or receive from her neighbors or from Internet, in all the
available channels, are constrained by the total number of
her network interface cards. Therefore, the following node
constraint should hold for every node i ∈ I and slot t ∈ T :
∑
f∈F
ŷfi [t] + ∑
k∈In(i)
x̂fki[t] +
∑
j∈Out(i)
x̂fij [t]
 ≤ ki, (4)
which does not include the cellular transmissions since they
use a different NIC.
Moreover, the transmissions of the different nodes are
coupled due to interference. In particular, based on the protocol
interference model [25], [29], we assume that a transmission
over link (i, j) ∈ E in t is successful only if all nodes that are
connected to i or j through an interference or communication
link are idle, i.e., do not transmit or receive data during t. To
facilitate modeling, we define the set of all interfering links:
I(i, j) ={(c, b), (a, c) : c ∈ N e(i) ∪N e(j),
b ∈ Out(c), a ∈ In(c)}, ∀(i, j) ∈ E .
Therefore we have the set of interference constraints:
x̂fij [t] +
∑
(k,m)∈I(i,j)
x̂fkm[t] +∑
k∈N e(i)∪N e(j)
ŷfk [t] ≤ 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ E , t ∈ T , f ∈ F (5)
Equation sets (2)-(5) constitute the sufficient and necessary
conditions for a feasible channel assignment and scheduling
in the UPN during T . However, the above binary variables
render any scheduling optimization problem highly complex
since they require - as it will be explained below - the solution
of challenging discrete non-linear optimization problems. To
address this issue, we employ a continuous-time approxima-
tion for modeling the operation of the UPN. This yields the
one-off servicing policy the nodes decide at the beginning of
each period T . Nevertheless, since this policy is based on the
detailed slot-by-slot analysis, it enables the design of near-
optimal solutions as it will become clear next.
Routing and Internet Access Decisions. Specifically, we
follow the analysis (among others) of [25], [26], and [30], and
relax the above discrete decision variables by employing the
average data rates over each link in every channel. In detail,
we use yci (n) ≥ 0 and yfi (n) ≥ 0 to denote user i’s average
downloading rate (from the Internet) for commodity n ∈ I,
over the cellular connection or the Wi-Fi channel f ∈ F ,
respectively. Specifically, we define :∑
n∈I
yfi (n) = C
f
i
T∑
t=1
ŷfi [t]/T , ∀ i ∈ I, f ∈ F , (6)
∑
n∈I
yci (n) = C
c
i
T∑
t=1
ŷci [t]/T , ∀ i ∈ I, (7)
where notice that we sum over all commodities.
Also, we denote xfij(n) ≥ 0 as user i’s average rate of
routing data of commodity n to her one-hop downstream
neighbor j, using channel f ∈ F . These routing decisions
are determined by the scheduling decisions:∑
n∈I
xfij(n) = C
f
ij
T∑
t=1
x̂fij [t]/T, , ∀(i, j) ∈ E , f ∈ F (8)
Using the above definitions we can describe the operation of
the UPN with the routing matrix x =
(
xfij(n) ≥ 0 : (i, j) ∈
E , n ∈ I, n 6= i, f ∈ F), and the Internet access matrix
y =
(
yfi (n), y
c
i (n) ≥ 0 : i ∈ I, n ∈ I, f ∈ F
)
. These
matrices comprise also the channel and commodity selection
decisions.
With the above continuous-time relaxation and substituting
(6)-(8) to (2)-(5) we devise the necessary conditions for a
schedule to be feasible. In detail, based on (4) we have the
following node-radio constraint set for the Wi-Fi NICs:∑
k∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I x
f
ki(n)
Cfki
+
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
+
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I y
f
i (n)
Cfi
≤ ki, ∀ i ∈ I. (9)
Similarly, eq. (5) lead to the scheduling constraints:∑
(k,m)∈I(i,j)
∑
n∈I x
f
km(n)
Cfkm
+
∑
n∈I x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
+ (10)
∑
k∈N e(i)∪N e(j)
∑
n∈I y
f
k (n)
Cfk
≤ 1, ∀ (i, j) ∈ E , ∀f ∈ F .
Note that the last term includes the Internet access transmis-
sions of both nodes i (as a neighbor of j) and j (as a neighbor
of i). Moreover, according to (2) and (3), the transmissions in
different channels over each link are coupled:∑
f∈F
∑
n∈N x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
≤ 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (11)
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∑
f∈F
∑
n∈N y
f
i (n)
Cfi
≤ 1,
∑
n∈I
yci (n) ≤ Cci , ∀ i ∈ I. (12)
Finally, the routing and Internet access variables should
satisfy the flow conservation constraints:∑
j∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
xfji(n) + y
c
i (n) +
∑
f∈F
yfi (n) =∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
xfij(n), ∀ i, n ∈ I, n 6= i. (13)
In other words, the data that node i ∈ I receives from
her upstream neighbors plus the data she downloads (over
all channels) should be equal to the amount of data she
routes to her downstream neighbors. This should hold for all
commodities except n = i that is consumed locally by i.
Using matrices x and y, we can determine the UPN opera-
tion (based on the objective that we will define in the sequel),
which is implementable (feasible) but not necessarily optimal.
In other words, due to the continuous-time relaxation the above
constraints are necessary but not sufficient for optimality [25].
On the other hand, we note that the proposed scheme is
expected to operate based on the 802.11 MAC protocol, which
does not support synchronous operation and hence cannot
apply the discrete-time solution (even if it was known). A
detailed gap characterization between the theoretical perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme and its implementation (e.g.,
by a practical protocol) will be part of our future work.
III. USERS DECISIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Data Consumption Utility. Each user i ∈ I has elastic
needs and perceives certain satisfaction for consuming data
(not including relaying for other users). This is modeled by
a utility function Ui(·) that depends on the aggregate average
rate ri, with which user i directly downloads and receives data
of commodity i from her neighbors, i.e.,
ri = y
c
i (i) +
∑
f∈F
yfi (i) +
∑
j∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
xfji(i) . (14)
Function Ui(·) is assumed to be positive, increasing, and
strictly concave. The concavity captures the user’s diminishing
marginal satisfaction of additional data consumption. Different
users may have different utility functions [31], [33]. For
example, the utility of a user who is streaming a video file
is initially proportional to the downloading rate, and saturates
after the maximum available (encoding) rate has been reached.
On the other hand, the utility of a user who is downloading a
file increases strictly with the downloading rate.
Energy Expenditure Cost. Energy consumption is a major
consideration for mobile users since their devices have often
limited energy resources [34]. Let ef,sij (joules/bytes) be the
energy that node i consumes when she sends one byte to node
j over link (i, j) ∈ E in channel f . Also, ef,rij denotes the
energy that node j consumes for receiving one byte from node
i in f . Finally, eci and e
f
i are the energy consumptions when
node i downloads one byte from the Internet, through her Wi-
Fi or cellular connection, respectively.
Providing analytical expressions for wireless transmission
energy costs is particularly challenging (e.g., see seminal
work [37]), and is further perplexed in the case of handheld
devices. For example, the relation of power consumption with
throughput is affected by the method that is employed to
increase the latter [38]. Nevertheless, it is commonly agreed
that the energy consumption depends on the transmission time
and the volume of transmitted data, and therefore on the link
capacity which in turn is shaped by the channel conditions. To
capture qualitatively the above aspects and avoid delving into
the physical layer details, we follow here the measurement
studies [35], [36], which indicate that the power consumption
(in mWatts) for transmitting (P f,sij ) and receiving (P
f,r
ij ) over
link (i, j) ∈ E has a constant offset plus a term linearly
dependent on the rate (hence depends also on channel f ):
P f,sij = δ
f,sCfij + θ
f,s, P f,rij = δ
f,rCfij + θ
f,r
Parameters δf,s, δf,r, θf,s, and θf,r are constants and depend
on the technology choices (Wi-Fi, 3G, or LTE-A) [35], [36].
Hence, the energy consumption of node i in link (i, j) is3:∑
n∈I
∑
f∈F
ef,sij x
f
ij(n)T =
∑
n∈I
∑
f∈F
xfij(n)
Cfij
T
(
δf,sCfij + θ
f,s
)
.
Note that the first term on the RHS captures the total time
(within T ) used for transmitting data in f , and the second
term of this product captures the power consumption on a
particular data rate. The energy consumption for a receiver can
be defined similarly. Finally, the total energy consumption by
node i is:
ei =
∑
n∈I
∑
f∈F
efi y
f
i (n)T +
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
n∈I
∑
f∈F
ef,sij x
f
ij(n)T
+ eci
∑
n∈I
yci (n)T +
∑
j∈In(i)
∑
n∈I
∑
f∈F
ef,rji x
f
ji(n)T . (15)
We assume that each node i ∈ I has a maximum energy
budget of Ei ≥ 0 units (joules). This parameter can be
explicitly set by the user (e.g., through a proper user interface
on the mobile app), or it may represent her actual residual
battery. Clearly, we need to have ei ≤ Ei for each node.
Moreover, different users may have different energy consump-
tion preferences. For example, some users may be willing to
consume almost their entire energy budgets, while others may
prefer a much more conservative energy consumption.
To capture the above user difference, we introduce for
each user i an energy cost (or, dissatisfaction) function Vi(·),
which is positive, increasing, and strictly convex in ei. Its
value goes to infinity when the energy budget of the user
is depleted. A function that satisfies these requirements is,
for example, Vi(ei) = φi/(Ei − ei), where φi ∈ [0, 1] is
a normalization parameter indicating user i’s sensitivity in
energy consumption. Finally, we wish to stress that there is
an additional energy cost for the exchange of coordination
messages (as it will be explained in Section V) and an energy
consumption due to ACK messages. The latter is a relatively
small portion of the relayed traffic volume, and does not have
a significant impact on the UPN operation [28].
Data Plan Cost. The impact of the remaining data plan
quota on users’ collaboration decisions are very crucial. Yet,
the analysis of quota dynamics is very challenging [40],
especially if the demand is elastic and dynamically decided
(as here). In order to study this aspect in a tractable fashion,
3This formulation assumes that each time a link is employed, it can achieve its
maximum capacity since the underlying scheduling scheme ensures a proper coordination
among the interfering transmissions [32], [26]. If the scheduling is achieved with
the traditional CSMA/CA protocol, i.e., not a time-slotted system, then the energy
consumption will be higher due to collisions.
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Symbol Physical Meaning
Cfij Capacity of link (i, j) ∈ E , channel f
ki Total number of NICs of each node i ∈ I
pfi Cost per byte over the Wi-Fi Internet link of i ∈ I
Cfi Capacity of Internet access link of node i in ch. f (Wi-Fi)
Cci Capacity of Internet access cellular link
ef,sij Consumed energy per transm. byte over link (i, j) (ch. f )
ef,rij Consumed energy per receiv. byte over link (i, j) (ch. f )
efi Consumed energy per receiv. byte at i for Wi-Fi Internet (f )
eci Consumed energy per receiv. byte at i for cellular Internet
xfij(n) Average transfer rate of commodity n over (i, j) in ch. f
yfi (n) Average download rate of commodity n by user i (ch. f )
yci (n) Average download rate of commodity n by user i (cellular)
zij(n) Currency that user j pays to i for receiving data n
x Routing matrix
y Internet access matrix
Ui(·) Utility function for user i
Vi(·) Energy consumption cost function for user i
Qi(·) Data plan cost function for user i
Ji(·) Payoff function for user i when joining the service
Jsi Standalone performance for user iT , T Time period T comprising T slots of unit length
we characterize each user by a psychological price per unit of
cellular data, as a function of her remaining data quota.
We assume that these psychological parameters remain fixed
during each time period, but they can change across different
time periods so as to reflect the quota’s impact. Therefore, the
dissatisfaction of each user i due to the consumption of her
data plan can be described by a convex function as follows:
Qi(y
ag,c
i ) =
oi
Ai − yag,ci
(16)
where yag,ci =
∑
n∈I y
c
i (n)T is the aggregate amount of data
that will be downloaded through her cellular link during T ,
and Ai the available quota at the beginning of the period. Pa-
rameter oi > 0 is the psychological price, which captures the
user aversion on the consumption of her data plan (including
the impact of the actual cost per byte, the anticipation of future
needs, and other such latent factors) and can vary both across
users and time periods. This model has the following desirable
properties. First, as the amount of consumed data approaches
the currently available quota, the psychological monetary cost
increases very fast. Second, even if two users i and j have the
same quotas (Ai = Aj) and download equal amounts of data
(yag,ci = y
ag,c
j ), they still might incur different costs due to
their preferences (oi 6= oj).
Payoff Function. In order to capture all the above aspects
that affect the users’ decisions, we introduce the payoff
function Ji(·) that user i receives when she participates in
the crowdsourced Internet access service. More specifically:
Ji(xi,x
in
i ,yi) = Ui(ri)−Qi(yag,ci )
−
∑
f∈F
pfi
∑
n∈I
yfi (n)T − Vi(ei),
where pfi ≥ 0 is the price for accessing Internet through Wi-Fi
channel f . Also, we have defined the matrices of downloading
and routing: yi = (y
f
i (n), y
c
i (n) : n ∈ I, f ∈ F), xi =
(xfij(n) : j ∈ Out(i), n ∈ I, f ∈ F), and xini = (xfji(n) :
j ∈ In(i), n ∈ I, f ∈ F).
Note that the payoff Ji monotonically decreases with the
amount of data that user i downloads for other users n ∈
I, n 6= i, and routes to her downstream neighbors. Therefore,
users are reluctant to execute these tasks without proper
compensations. Furthermore, some users may not have com-
munication needs in a certain time period, and therefore may
not be willing to participate in the UPN service. To address
these issues, it is necessary to use a payment mechanism
that will alter the payoff function of the users and promote
collaboration. We provide the details in Section IV.
Standalone Operation. Moreover, a rational user will join
the service only if this will improve her payoff in comparison
to her standalone performance. In the standalone operation,
each user i does not receive or deliver data to her neighbors,
nor she downloads data for any other user. Therefore, the
optimal Internet access strategy can be obtained by solving
the following Standalone Operation Problem (SOP):
max
yci (i),{yfi (i)}f∈F
Ui
(
yci (i) +
∑
f∈F
yfi (i)
)− pfi ∑
f∈F
yfi (i)T
−Qi(yci )− Vi
(
yci (i) +
∑
f∈F
yfi (i)
)
(17)
s.t.
∑
f∈F
yfi (i)
Cfi
≤ 1, 0 ≤ yci (i) ≤ Cci , (18)
where we have written both Ui(·) and Vi(·) as functions of
the downloading decisions of user i. This problem has a
strictly concave objective, and a compact and convex non-
empty constraint set (under the assumption of at least one
non-zero Internet access capacity). Hence, it has a unique
solution denoted as Jsi , where s stands for “standalone”. This
will serve in the sequel as the performance benchmark for the
comparison purpose.
Problem Statement. We are interested in designing a
resource sharing mechanism that determines how much re-
sources each user should contribute, in terms of Internet
access, relaying bandwidth, and battery energy, so as to max-
imize the service capacity (amount of data delivered within
period T ). Accordingly, the mechanism should decide how this
capacity will be shared by the users, and how they should be
compensated for their contribution in terms of money transfers.
These tasks should be jointly designed to satisfy the agreed
fairness criterion. Formally, the problem is defined as follows:
UPN Collaboration and Servicing Problem: Given the
graph G = (I, E ,B), the capacity constraints, energy con-
sumption parameters, pricing parameters, and the users’ util-
ity functions, find the Internet access, routing and payment
decisions of the users, which ensure the fair and efficient
performance of the crowdsourced Internet access service.
IV. THE COOPERATIVE SERVICING GAME
A. Virtual Currency System
In these cooperative systems, an important issue that may
deteriorate their performance is the problem of double coin-
cidence of needs [20]. In the context of UPNs, this problem
appears as follows. A user served by another user may not
be able to directly return the favor in the current period by
offering similar services. Therefore, users may not want to help
those that cannot reciprocate. Clearly, this problem reduces the
number of users who can potentially collaborate with each
other and impacts the UPN performance.
To address the above issue, we introduce a virtual currency
system where users pay for the services they receive and are
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paid when offering such services. This solution makes offering
service more attractive even for users who do not currently
have communication needs. Since we aim at a decentralized
service design, we assume that transactions are only possible
among adjacent nodes (i.e., two nodes of the same link) instead
of between the final destination node and the gateway or the
intermediate relays. Specifically, let zji(n) ≥ 0 denote the
currency paid by user i to j, for the data of commodity n that
is delivered over link (j, i) ∈ E .
At the beginning of the current period, each user i has a
budget Di ≥ 0, and is rewarded with an additional amount
γ > 0 of virtual currency by the system for her participation
in the current period. This value of γ is small, compared to the
payments exchanged among the nodes, and it is identical for
each user. However, γ is very important, as we explain in detail
below, since it ensures that all users are willing to participate
in the service even if they don’t eventually exchange Internet
access and relaying services with the other users.
At the end of the period, user i’s virtual currency budget is:
Hi(zi, z
out
i ) = βi
(
Di + γ +
∑
n∈I
∑
j∈Out(i)
zij(n)
−
∑
n∈I
∑
j∈In(i)
zji(n)
)
,
where we have defined zi =
(
zji(n) : j ∈ In(i), n ∈ I
)
and zouti =
(
zij(n) : j ∈ Out(i), n ∈ I
)
. Parameter βi > 0
captures how important the virtual currency is for user i, i.e.,
reflects her expectation for exploiting the virtual currency in
the future. Parameter βi can be considered as the discount
rate for each user. For example, a user that does not intend
to participate in the service later does not value the virtual
currency much, and her corresponding βi will be close to 0.
Alternatively, these parameters can be set by the service so
as to normalize the virtual currency benefit with the benefits
of the served data. The linear form of Hi(zi, zouti ) implies
that users are risk neutral [19]. After introducing the virtual
currency system, the payoff of each user becomes the sum of
Ji(·) and Hi(·).
B. Bargaining Problem
The users are self-interested, and only participate in the
crowdsourced connectivity service if this ensures higher pay-
offs for them. In this work, we propose a resource sharing
scheme based on the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), which
has the following desirable properties [19], [41]:
Strong Efficiency: The solution is Pareto optimal. Hence,
there is no other feasible solution which yields a better payoff
than the NBS for one user, and no worse payoff for all the
other users.
Individual Rationality: The solution offers to each user a
payoff that is no worse than the payoff she has when she does
not participate in the bargaining game (disagreement point).
This property is especially important for our problem, as a
fairness rule based on direct resource allocation only (e.g.,
an equal energy or bandwidth sharing scheme) may fail to
incentivize all users to join the service.
Scale Covariance: If we apply an affine transformation to
the players’ utility functions, then the initial solution can yield
the corresponding bargaining solution for the new problem
under the same affine transformation. This property ensures
that the resource allocation is fair and optimal, independently
of the way that we measure the players’ utilities.
Symmetry and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:
These two properties ensure that outcomes which would not
have been selected (i.e., they are not favorable to users), do
not affect the bargaining solution. Moreover, the payoff that
each user receives does not depend on her identity/label.
We define an |I|-person bargaining game [18], where
users can exchange services and pay each other with virtual
currency. Hence, the produced welfare (service capacity and
currency) can be divided in an arbitrary fashion among the
users. In line with similar commercial services, e.g., [13], we
assume that when a user joins the UPN she may cooperate
with any of the other nearby users, i.e., there is no option
for selecting with whom to cooperate. Hence, this is a pure
bargaining problem.
However, the formulation and distributed algorithm design
for solving this NBS problem are highly non-trivial and
depart significantly from previous related approaches, e.g.,
[41]. Namely, the coupling of the decisions of different users in
their payoff functions (i.e., they need to agree on channels and
allocated rates per commodity) and in the constraints set (e.g.,
when computing the link capacities), as well as the existence
of the virtual currency payments call for a new approach.
Let us first give the formal NBS definition. Consider the
game G = 〈I,A, {wi}〉, where I , {1, 2, ..., I} is the player
set, and A , A1 ×A2 × ...×AI is the strategy space where
Ai is the set of strategies (actions) available to player i. The
payoff of each player i, wi(·), depends on the strategy profile
of all players, a = (a1, a2, ..., aI), with ai ∈ Ai. The NBS
for this game is [19]:
Definition 1 (Nash Bargaining Solution–NBS). The strategy
profile a∗ = (a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
I) is an NBS, if it solves the
following problem:
max
a∈A
Πi∈I
(
wi(a)− wdi
)
s.t. wi(a) ≥ wdi , ∀ i ∈ I (35)
where wdi is the disagreement point of player i, i.e., her payoff
when an agreement is not reached.
Next we consider an equivalent formulation, where the
product of terms in (35) is substituted by the sum of the cor-
responding logarithms [41]. Hence, we define the Bargaining
Optimization Problem (BOP):
max
x,y,z
∑
i∈I
log
(
Ji(xi,x
in
i ,yi) +Hi(zi, z
out
i )− Jsi − βiDi
)
s.t. (9), (10), (11), (12), (13)∑
n∈I
( ∑
j∈In(i)
zji(n)−
∑
j∈Out(i)
zij(n)
) ≤ Di + γ,∀i ∈ I
(36)
Ji(xi,x
in
i ,yi) +Hi(zi, z
out
i ) ≥ Jsi + βiDi,∀ i ∈ I (37)
0 ≤ xfij(n) ≤ Cfij , ∀ i, j, n ∈ I, f ∈ F , (38)
0 ≤ yci (n) ≤ Cci , ∀ i ∈ I, n ∈ I , (39)
0 ≤ yfi (n) ≤ Cfi , ∀ i, n ∈ I, f ∈ F , (40)
0 ≤ zij(n) ≤
∑
i∈I
(Di + γ), ∀ i, j, n ∈ I , (41)
where the disagreement point for each user is the sum of
the standalone performance Jsi she can achieve, and the
normalized virtual currency βiDi she has at the beginning
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L =
∑
i∈I
[
log
(
Jci (xi, ξi,yi) +Hi(zi,σi)− Jsi − βiDi
)
+
∑
n∈I
λi(n)
( ∑
j∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
xfji(n) + y
c
i (n) +
∑
f∈F
yfi (n)−
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
xfij(n)
)
+
∑
n∈I
∑
j∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
τfji(n)(ξ
f
ji(n)− xfji(n)) +
∑
n∈I
∑
j∈Out(i)
piij(n)(σij(n)− zij(n))− ρi
(∑
n∈I
∑
j∈In(i)
zji(n)−Di − γ
−
∑
n∈I
∑
j∈Out(i)
zij(n)
)− µi( ∑
k∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I x
f
ki(n)
Cfki
+
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
+
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I y
f
i (n)
Cfi
− ki
)− (34)
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
ψfij
( ∑
(k,m)∈I(i,j)
∑
n x
f
km(n)
Cfkm
+
∑
n x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
+
∑
k∈Ne(i)∪Ne(j)
∑
n y
f
k (n)
Cfk
− 1)].
of the period. Eq. (36) states that users cannot have a virtual
currency deficit. Eq. (37) is the individual-rationality constraint
indicating that each user will agree to cooperate only if this
does not make her payoff worse. Eq. (38)-(40) ensure that
all flows will satisfy the capacity constraints of the respective
links. Finally, notice that in (41), each payment decision zij(n)
is bounded by the total virtual currency at the system. This
restrains users from asking or promising payments that exceed
the volume of this virtual economy (hence being infeasible)
and as we will explain in the sequel, it will also facilitate the
convergence of the distributed algorithm.
The BOP problem always has a non-empty feasible region.
Therefore, due to (37) there is no user of whom the payoff
will decrease by participating in the service. Hence, all users
are incentivized to join the service in each time period. Tech-
nically, this is ensured due to the virtual currency system and
specifically the rewarding parameter γ. We should emphasize,
however, that it is not necessary that all participating users will
serve other users at the NBS. The optimal solution depends
on the properties of the UPN graph G and the users’ needs
and resources. The solution of the BOP problem is unique. In
particular, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. The BOP problem has a unique optimal solution.
Proof: The objective function is strictly concave, since it
is a composition of (strictly) concave functions. Additionally,
the constraint set is compact, convex and non-empty. Notice
that constraint (37) can always be satisfied by some solution
point. For example, each user i can choose not to route any
traffic, i.e., xfij(n) = x
f
ji(n) = 0, ∀ i, j, n ∈ I, f ∈ F ,
and only download data for herself. This way, she achieves
her standalone performance, but still improves her payoff
due to the participation reward γ. This also ensures that the
logarithmic arguments are non-zero. Therefore, the problem
has always a unique solution (x∗,y∗, z∗) [24].
We can derive the solution of the BOP problem by solving
the KKT conditions [24]. This will yield the efficient and fair
Internet access and routing decisions as well as the preferable
channel for each communication link. Additionally, it will
determine the currency transfers among the users. Based on the
system parameters, i.e., connection capacities, battery energy,
and data plans, the service can offload data to Wi-Fi networks
or onload data to cellular networks.
However, in all cases, the critical question is whether we
can find this solution in a distributed fashion, so as to enable
the distributed execution of the resource sharing mechanism.
This is an important feature for such crowdsourced mobile
Internet access services without central controllers.
V. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM DESIGN FOR BOP
The difficulties to solve the BOP problem in a distributed
fashion are twofold. First, the decision variables of different
users are coupled in the constraints. That is, the routing
decisions of each user should take into account the capac-
ity constraints of her neighboring nodes. Second, there is
coupling in the objective functions. Namely, the logarithmic
component of the BOP objective that corresponds to each user
i is dependent on the decision variables of her neighbors.
We address these issues by introducing new auxiliary local
variables for each user and consistency constraints for each
pair of neighboring users (for the coupled objectives) [23]. The
transformed problem then has coupling only in the constraints,
and can be solved using a primal-dual Lagrange iterative
decomposition method [23].
Let us focus on user i ∈ I. Her payoff depends on her
own decisions (xi,yi, zi) and the decisions xini , and z
out
i
of her one-hop neighbors. Clearly, node i can route data
to her upstream neighbors In(i) only if they agree on the
servicing rate and the respective payments. To deal with these
decision couplings, we introduce the auxiliary variables and
component-wise equality constraints as follows:
ξfji(n) = x
f
ji(n), ∀ i ∈ I, j ∈ In(i), n ∈ I, f ∈ F , (42)
σij(n) = zij(n), ∀ i ∈ I, j ∈ Out(i), n ∈ I . (43)
We also define the matrices ξi = (ξ
f
ji(n) ≥ 0 : j ∈ In(i), n ∈
I, f ∈ F) and σi = (σij(n) : j ∈ Out(i), n ∈ I) that are
maintained locally by every node i ∈ I. Technically, these
local variables substitute the decisions xini , and z
out
i of i’s
neighbors, and hence enable her to optimize independently
her payoff function. This way, each user can independently
determine her downloading, routing, and payment variables,
subject to coordination with her one-hop neighbors that is
achieved when (42) and (43) are satisfied.
Accordingly, we relax constraints (9), (10), (13), (36), (42),
and (43), and introduce the respective Lagrange multipliers:
λ = (λi(n) : i ∈ I, n ∈ I, n 6= i), µ = (µi ≥ 0, i ∈ I)
ψ =
(
ψfij ≥ 0,∀ (i, j) ∈ E , f ∈ F
)
, ρ = (ρi ≥ 0 : i ∈ I)
τ =
(
τfji(n) : i, n ∈ I, j ∈ In(i), f ∈ F
)
,
pi =
(
piij(n) : i, n ∈ I, j ∈ Out(i)
)
.
Then, we define the (partial) Lagrangian shown in eq. (34),
which is separable in user-specific components Li(·), i ∈ I. In
each iteration q of the primal-dual update, the user maximizes
the Lagrange function in terms of the primal variables and
uses the obtained values to update the dual variables. More
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specifically, each user i ∈ I solves the following problem in
every iteration:
max
xi,yi,zi,ξi,σi
Li
(
xi, ξi,yi, zi,σi
)
(44)
Jci (xi, ξi,yi) +Hi(zi,σi)− Jsi − βiDi > 0 (45)∑
n∈I
yci (n) ≤ Cci ,
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I y
f
i (n)
Cfi
≤ 1, (46)
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈N x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Out(i), (47)
0 ≤ xfij(n) ≤ Cfij , n ∈ I, f ∈ F , j ∈ Out(i), (48)
0 ≤ ξfji(n) ≤ Cfji, n ∈ I, f ∈ F , j ∈ Out(i), (49)
0 ≤ yfi (n) ≤ Cfi , n ∈ I, f ∈ F , (50)
0 ≤ yci (n) ≤ Cci , n ∈ I, (51)
0 ≤ zji(n) ≤ K, n ∈ I, j ∈ In(i), (52)
where the objective Li(·) is:
Li = log
(
Ji(xi, ξi,yi) +Hi(zi,σi)− Jsi − βiDi
)
+
∑
n∈I
[
λi(n)(y
c
i (n) +
∑
f∈F
yfi (n))
−
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
xfij(n)(λi(n)− λj(n))
]− ρi∑
n∈I
∑
j∈In(i)
zji(n)
+
∑
j∈In(i)
(
ρj
∑
n∈I
zji(n) +
∑
n∈I
∑
f∈F
τfji(n)ξ
f
ji(n)
)
−
∑
n∈I
[ ∑
j∈Out(i)
(∑
f∈F
xfij(n)τ
f
ij(n)− piij(n)σij(n)
)
+
∑
j∈In(i)
piji(n)zji(n)
]− ∑
j∈Out(i)
µj
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
− µi
[ ∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I x
f
ij(n)
Cfij
+
∑
f∈F
∑
n∈I y
f
i (n)
Cfi
]
−
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
ψfij
[∑n∈I xfij(n)
Cfij
+
∑
n y
f
i (n)
Cfi
]
−
∑
k∈N e(i)
∑
f∈F
ψfki
[∑
n y
f
i (n)
Cfi
+
∑
m∈Out(i)
∑
n∈I x
f
im(n)
Cfim
]
.
The solution yields the optimal (in the current iteration q)
values x(q)i ,y
(q)
i , z
(q)
i , ξ
(q)
i ,σ
(q)
i .
User i then uses the above values of the primal variables to
calculate the gradients and update the dual variables [24]:
λ
(q+1)
i (n) = λ
(q)
i (n) + s
(q)
[ ∑
j∈In(i)
∑
f∈F
x
f (q)
ji (n) + y
c (q)
i (n)
+
∑
f∈F
y
f (q)
i (n)−
∑
j∈Out(i)
∑
f∈F
x
f (q)
ij (n)
]
(53)
τ
f (q+1)
ji (n) = τ
f (q)
ji (n) + s
(q) · (ξf (q)ji (n)− xf (q)ji (n)) (54)
pi
(q+1)
ij (n) = pi
(q)
ij (n) + s
(q) · (σ(q)ij (n)− z(q)ij (n)) (55)
Algorithm 1: Distributed Solution of BOP
output: x∗, y∗, z∗
1 q ← 0;
2 Set x(0), y(0), z(0), ξ(0), σ(0), λ(0), τ (0), pi(0), ρ(0), µ(0),
ψ(0), ;
3 conv flag ← 0; # initialize the convergence flag
4 while conv flag = 0 do
5 q ← q + 1;
6 for i = 1 : I do
7 Solve (44- 52) for primal vars
x
(q)
i ,y
(q)
i ,z
(q)
i , ξ
(q)
i ,σ
(q)
i
8 Send xf (q)ij (n),∀n ∈ I \ {i}, f ∈ F , to j ∈ Out(i);
9 Send z(q)ji (n), ∀n ∈ I \ {i}, to j ∈ In(i);
10 for j = 1 : I , n = 1 : I do
11 Calculate dual vars
λ
(q+1)
i (n), τ
f (q+1)
ji (n), pi
(q+1)
ij (n),
ρ
(q+1)
i , ψ
f (q+1)
ij , µ
(q+1)
i using (53-56);
end
12 Send λ(q+1)i (n), τ
f (q+1)
ji (n), µ
(q+1)
i ∀n ∈ I \ {i},
f ∈ F , to j ∈ In(i);
13 Send ρ(q+1)i , pi
(q+1)
ij (n), ψ
f (q+1)
ij ∀n ∈ I \ {i}, f ∈ F ,
to j ∈ Out(i);
end
14 if |[λ(q+1)i (n)− λ(q)i (n)]/λ(q)i (n)| <  and
|[ρ(q+1)i − ρ(q)i ]/ρ(q)i | <  and
|[pi(q+1)ij (n)− pi(q)ij (n)]/pi(q)ij (n)| <  and
|[τf (q+1)ji (n)− τf (q)ji (n)]/τf (q)ji (n)| <  and
|[ψf (q+1)ij − ψf (q)ij ]/ψf (q)ij | <  |[µ(q+1)i − µ(q)i ]/µ(q)i | < 
∀i, n ∈ I, f ∈ F , j ∈ Out(i) then
conv flag← 1;
end
end
ρ
(q+1)
i =
[
ρ
(q)
i + s
(q)
(∑
n∈I
(
∑
j∈In(i)
z
(q)
ji (n)
−
∑
j∈Out(i)
z
(q)
ij (n))− γ −Di
)]+
(56)
where [·]+ denotes the projection onto the non-negative orthant
and s(q) ≥ 0 is a properly selected step during iteration q
[24]. A similar formula is also applied for updating µi ≥ 0
and ψfij ≥ 0, based on the set of equations (9) and (10), re-
spectively. Finally, each user passes the updated dual variables
to her one-hop neighbors, who will use them to optimize the
primal variables in the next iteration.
The Algorithm is executed in a synchronous fashion, which
requires a common clock of all users and a small delay for
message passing (circulation of the dual and primal variables).
This is a reasonable assumption for small-scale crowdsourced
connectivity networks in a small neighborhood. The complete
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1 and is provably
converging to the optimal solution.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 1 globally converges to the optimal
solution (x∗,y∗, z∗) of the BOP problem, under properly
chosen step sizes s(q) for each iteration q.
Proof: BOP has a strictly concave objective and a closed,
non-empty and convex constraint set. Thus, Algorithm 1
converges to optimal solution [24] if (i) the step sequence s(q),
q = 1, 2, . . . , is properly selected, and (ii) the gradients used
in (53)-(56), are bounded. Consider user i, and we see that the
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variables xfij(n), y
f
i (n), y
c
i (n), ξ
f
ji(n) are upper bounded by
constraints (48) - (51) and the energy cost function (since it
is strictly convex), and zji(n), n ∈ I, j ∈ Out(i) are positive
and upper bounded by K. Hence, if we employ a diminishing
step size, e.g. s(q) = (1 +m)/(t+m) with m ≥ 0, then the
convergence is guaranteed [23], [24].
Notice that each user passes messages for each commodity
n ∈ I, only to her one-hop neighbors. Hence, the message
passing overhead of the algorithm is O(d¯|I||F|), where d¯ is
the average degree of the graph G. However, we expect that
the number of users in the group will be small (due to the need
to be in proximity), hence even a complexity of O(|F||I|2)
(assuming a fully connected graph) is affordable. Finally, note
that this required exchange of messages will induce energy
cost to the devices, additional to the energy expenditure due to
the data downloading and relaying. The actual energy impact
of this coordination depends on the technology used (e.g., how
often the UPN is reconfigured, as we experimentally showed
in [28]) and it’s study is beyond the scope of this work.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we employ a representative system setup,
and demonstrate how the collaborative connectivity service
performs in a variety of different scenarios. The system
parameters follow experimental studies [36], [35], [42], [43].
Simulation Setup. We consider a set of |I| = 6 users
randomly placed in a geographic area, and study their inter-
actions for a time period of T = 100 seconds. The Internet
access capacity of each user depends on whether she uses a
cellular LTE-A, 3G, or a Wi-Fi connection. Field experiments
have measured the actual average speed to be 12.74 Mbps for
LTE-A, 4.12 Mbps for Wi-Fi, and 1 Mbps for 3G networks
[36], [42]. Moreover, we assume that there are 3 orthogonal
channels for Wi-Fi which, in general, may have different
capacities due to the surrounding (background) interference
beyond the UPN transmissions.
The users communicate with each other using Wi-Fi Direct,
and each user i has one NIC, i.e., ki = 1. The achievable rate
among two users i and j decreases with their distance dij
(in meters). In order to account for a representative setting
with random channel conditions, we assume that two users
separated by 1 meter can achieve a maximum communication
speed of 64Mbps; the speed drops to 0.1 Mbps when the
distance increases to 30 meters. The rate will be smaller if
there is interference, and zero when the distance is larger than
30 meters. Therefore, the average data rate Cfij that can be
transferred over each link (i, j) ∈ E and channel f satisfies:
Cfij = b
f
ij · 100 log(1 + 0.9/d2ij) . (57)
where bfij ∈ [0.5, 1] is a uniformly random variable modeling
the effect of surrounding interference in channel f ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The energy consumed by a data transfer is proportional to
the data volume, the transmission power and rate, and the
channel conditions (e.g., due to distance and packet retransmis-
sions [43]) [35]. We use here eq. (15), where the parameters
are selected according to [36]: the energy consumption for 3G
links is twice as for LTE links, and 4 times higher than Wi-
Fi. Also, uplink transmission consumes 8 times more energy
in LTE and 3G, and 2 times more in Wi-Fi, than downlink
transmissions. Note that for our comparative study the above
relative values are adequate enough.
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
2
4
D
ow
nl
. (
M
Bi
t)
Node Download, Consume, Relay
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
2
4
C
on
su
m
ed
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
2
4
Node ID
R
el
ay
ed
Independent
Bargaining
Fig. 4. Comparison of independent, and bargained solution. Sys-
tem parameters: {Ci}i = {9.7, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 4.12, 2.1}Mbps, {pi}i =
{0.02, 0.02, 0.008, 0.001, 0.0, 0.0} $/Mbit. User 2 has higher demand than
other users, i.e., αi = 2, i ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5, 6} and α2 = 4. The figure shows
the total amount of downloaded, consumed, and relayed data per second.
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Fig. 5. Detailed example of the UPN operation under the Nash bargaining
solution. Users’ parameters are given in caption of Fig. 4. In the graph on the
right, blue squares represent amounts of downloaded data by each node, and
light-blue shaded boxes the amounts of consumed data. Dotted lines show
connectivity and red lines represent the amount of relayed data. Actual values
are shown on the left table.
Every user i ∈ I has a logarithmic utility function
Ui = αi log
(
1 + ri
)
, (58)
which satisfies the principle of diminishing marginal returns,
and ri is given by eq. (14). Parameter αi ∈ [0, 1] captures the
different communication needs of the different users. Also,
the virtual currency parameters βi, ∀i ∈ I, are uniformly
distributed in (0, 1]. Finally, regarding the cellular data costs,
we employ two approaches to make our study more compre-
hensive. First, we assume that the user’s dissatisfaction can
be a simple linear function of consumed data amount, and
we use the representative price reported by ITU (for UK) [5],
i.e., 0.002$/Mbit. Second, we also use the psychological price
given by eq. (16), where the quotas are selected randomly from
the interval [0, 5]GBytes, unless otherwise specified. Finally,
for both cases, we set pi = 0 for users who have an unlimited
cellular data plan or using Wi-Fi connections.
1) Comparison of Bargained and Independent Solutions:
Our first goal is to study the UPN operation from the point-of-
view of the user. That is, we wish to demonstrate the impact of
collaboration on the amount of data that each user consumes,
and on the users’ payoff. We compare the “bargained” payoff
JGi for each user i with the “independent” payoff J
s
i . We
consider a setting with 6 users, where user 1 has an LTE
connection, user 2 does not have Internet access, users 3
and 4 have 3G connections, and users 5 and 6 have Wi-Fi
connections. The Internet access capacity and price values
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(linear cost is assumed here) are shown in the caption of Figure
4. Also, user i = 2 has higher utility (α2 = 4) compared
to the other users (αi = 2, i 6= 2). For simplicity, all other
system parameters have been set equal for all users. The
results represent the average obtained over 50 experiments for
different user locations, namely uniformly distributed in the
[0, 100m]× [0, 100m] plane.
In Figure 4 we plot the total amount of data each user
downloads, consumes, and relays for both scenarios (partic-
ipation in UPN or not). We observe that users download
(almost) the same amount of data in both cases, apart from
user 2 who cannot access the Internet independently. In the
bargained scenario, users consume different amounts of data
since some of them relay traffic for others. For example, user 1
consumes on average 46% less data in the bargained scenario
compared to her standalone operation (she routes the rest 54%
to her neighbors). This cooperation depends heavily on user 1’s
valuation for the virtual currency, and thus for receiving UPN
service in the future. It is clear that the extent to which the
users will relay traffic for others depends on the relative value
of the virtual currency to their aggregate opportunity cost (not
downloading for their own needs), Internet usage, and energy
consumption costs. To further help the reader build intuition,
we present a detailed snapshot of the UPN operation for one
of the 50 experiments in Figure 5.
2) Impact of Users Diversity on UPN Performance: Next
we investigate how the performance benefits of the UPN
service depend on the users’ diversity, specifically on the
differences in their (i) Internet access capacity, (ii) energy
consumption parameters, and (iii) data plan parameters. Start-
ing with case (i), we assume that two users have the same
high Internet access capacity (C0H = 12.7 Mbps) and the
other four identical low Internet capacity C0L that gradually
increases from 1 Mbps to 5 Mbps. All other parameters are
fixed and equal for all six users. In Fig. 6(a) we plot the
aggregate amount of downloaded data for the bargained and
independent solutions. We observe that as users become less
diverse (value of C0L increases), the gap of total downloaded
data (per time period) for the bargained solution compared to
the standalone solution decreases from 29.36% to almost 0%.
We can observe a similar trend regarding the user diversity in
terms of energy consumption. Namely, we consider the above
setup and assume that two users have low energy consumption
cost ecL = 0.15 J/Mbit and the other four identical high energy
consumption parameter ecH = 1.13 J/Mbit which decreases
gradually to 0.24. In this case, the benefit of the service
decreases from 15% to almost 0%, as is shown in Fig. 6(b).
The intuition is that the more diverse the Internet capacities or
the energy consumption parameters of the users are, the larger
the benefits from their cooperation.
Finally, we study the impact of data plan diversity in Figure
6(c). We assume that the cellular access cost is given by
function Qi(y
ag,c
i ) (eq. (16)), and that the only difference of
users is in parameter oi (similar results obtained when the
diversity is in Ai). That is, two of them have lower value (oL)
than the other four users (oH ), and this ratio increases along
the x-axis, becoming eventually oL/oH = 1 (no diversity
case). As it is expected, the cooperation benefit diminishes
as the diversity among the psychological prices of the users
decreases. Interestingly, however, for very diverse scenarios
(oL/oH < 0.2), the nodes download more data under the
independent operation than the bargained operation. In this
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Fig. 6. Impact of user diversity on collaboration benefits. All results are
averaged over 30 runs with uniformly distributed user locations in [0, 100m]×
[0, 100m]. Users are identical in all aspects, except the following parameters
(a): Diverse Internet access: C01 = C02 = C0H = 12.7 Mbps, C03 =
C04 = C05 = C06 = C0L Mbps; (b): Diverse energy consumption per
downloaded byte: ec1 = e
c
2 = e
c
L, and the remaining four have the same
higher value ecH ; (c): Diverse data plan parameters: o1 = o2 = oL, and the
other four have the same higher value oH .
case, the four users with the expensive data plans find it much
more beneficial to buy data (using the virtual currency) from
the other two users in the bargained scenario. Correspondingly,
the two users with the low-cost data plans assess the trade off
between consuming data and downloading (and relaying) for
their neighbors, and find the latter to be more beneficial (due
to the virtual currency payments). Such a decision reduces
the total data downloaded by these two users, due to the
additional energy consumption when relaying data for others.
This simple example reveals that the parameters of the users
can have complicated impacts on the final network operation.
Our algorithm ensures that the UPN operation is optimal as it
maximizes the users’ payoffs according to the NBS.
3) Offloading and Onloading Capabilities of UPNs: Fi-
nally, we consider the UPN operation from the networks’s
point of view, and explore how the traffic is shifted among
different networks due to cooperation. Namely, the cooperating
users may route data that was intended for a cellular network
to a Wi-Fi network (offloading), or the other way around
(onloading). The latter option becomes attractive when Wi-Fi
links are congested and the cellular access capacity of some
users is high and of low cost. For this specific experiment,
we employ the setup shown in Figure 3 where two users, one
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 12
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Normalized Energy consumption (Joules/100KBytes)
O
nl
oa
de
d 
D
at
a 
(M
Bx
10
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
0.5
1
1.5
Cellular Usage Pricing (dollars per 10MBytes)
O
ffl
oa
de
d 
D
at
a 
(M
Bx
10
)
Fig. 7. Upper subfigure (Onloading): LTE-A capacity (10 Mbps) is 5 times
larger than the Wi-Fi capacity (2 Mbps), mobile data price is p = 0.002
$/Mbit, and the LTE link energy consumption 3-times larger than the Wi-
Fi link energy consumption. Lower subfigure (Offloading): LTE capacity (4
Mbps) is twice the Wi-Fi capacity, and data usage price increases.
with Wi-Fi Internet access (user 1) and the other with a cellular
access (user 2), form a UPN.
First we study onloading (Figure 3 right). We assume that
the cellular capacity (10 Mbps) is 5 times larger than the
Wi-Fi capacity (2 Mbps). The rest of the parameters are
identical for the two users. The mobile data price is equal
to p = 0.002 $/Mbit, and the LTE link energy consumption
3-times larger than the Wi-Fi link energy consumption. In this
setting we aim to investigate how the onloading is affected
by the energy consumption that the gateway node incurs. In
the upper subfigure of Figure 7 we depict the amount of
onloaded data, i.e., the data that user 2 (gateway) downloads
and delivers for user 1 (client), as a function of the relaying
energy consumption (ef,s21 ). The latter can vary if, for example,
the distance among the two nodes changes. We observe that
for a certain value range of ef,s21 the amount of onloaded data is
maximum and constant. However, as ef,s21 increases the BOP
solution yields smaller amounts of relayed data. This result
verifies again that the BOP solution takes into account all the
users’ characteristics and balances in a fair fashion the costs
and benefits of the UPN nodes.
Next we explore the offloading case (Figure 3 left). We
assume the cellular capacity is only twice of the Wi-Fi one (4
Mbps versus 2 Mbps). Having all the other parameters fixed
(and equal for the two nodes), we investigate how the amount
of data that user 1 (gateway) offloads for user 2 (client) varies
as the Internet access price increases. As we observe in the
lower subfigure in Figure 7, the amount of offloaded data
initially increases with the price per byte paid by the LTE user
2. This is expected since, as the mobile Internet becomes more
expensive, user 2 prefers to pay the Wi-Fi user with virtual
currency for the offloading, instead of downloading the content
from her cellular link. More interestingly, after a certain
point (when cellular pricing reaches 0.44), the offloaded data
decreases (compared to its maximum value) and then remains
constant despite the further cellular price increase. This inter-
esting result is due to the employed fairness criterion which
determines the performance that each user will receive in the
UPN in analogy to her standalone performance. Therefore,
since here the standalone performance Js2 of user 2 is reduced
(i.e., due to the increasing prices user 2 would download less
data in standalone operation), the respective performance J2
within the UPN (and hence the amount of offloaded data) first
decreases and accordingly remains constant.
VII. RELATED WORKS
One of the first UPN examples is the Wi-Fi community
networks [11]. The key challenges there include security
issues [44] and user participation incentives [45]. Similar
mechanisms have been studied for ad hoc networks [46], and
wireless mesh networks [58]. These results are not directly
applicable to mobile UPNs, since they do not account for
users’ different types of resources nor for their data usage
cost. Also, most UPN users can access the Internet without
relying on others’ help, while this is typically not the case
for other autonomous networks. The characterization of such
standalone operations is critical in determining whether a user
will agree to join the service or not. This is the reason we
employ the Nash bargaining solution [18], [41].
UPN services can be centralized (as in FON), or decentral-
ized where users negotiate with each other. For the former, [48]
studied a pricing rule for inducing service adoption, and [49]
analyzed the price competition among FON-like operators and
conventional operators. For decentralized services, [31] and
[33] performed game-theoretic analysis to predict the prices
users charge to each other. Our scheme differs in that each user
can have many roles and that multiple users can concurrently
collaborate. Furthermore, these prior studies did not account
for the limited data quotas and the energy limitations of users.
On the contrary, we propose a detailed approach for studying
the impact of quota dynamics [40] on users’ collaboration.
We follow the same approach to qualitatively study the effects
of energy consumption, since it is known that the analytical
relation of energy consumption and mobile transmissions
(especially in the unlicensed band) is essentially intractable,
e.g., [37], [38], [39]. Finally, another unique aspect of our
model is that the interactions among users from heterogeneous
networks (cellular and Wi-Fi), apart from offloading, enable
also the onloading of Wi-Fi traffic to cellular networks [22]
as illustrated in Figure 3. Such flexible cooperation framework
differs from previous offloading-only architectures [21].
In the context of mobile cooperative networks, references
[50] and [51] proposed energy-prudent architectures that ag-
gregate the cellular bandwidth of multiple hosts to build
mobile hotspots. Similarly, [52] presented a scheduling scheme
that allows hosts to dynamically admit client requests so as to
maximize their revenue. When each user can serve both as
a client and host, a decision framework should assign these
roles to users, based on their residual battery energy [53].
A similar model was proposed in [54]. Many related works
in this area assume that users have strong social ties [55]
or they are interested in the same content [56], hence there
is no need for incentive provision schemes. This assumption
was relaxed in [57] that proposed a rewarding scheme for
one-hop UPNs. Moreover, the above works did not consider
heterogeneous Internet access links nor multihop data delivery
solutions, as they mainly studied the collaboration among two
users over single-hop connections. Such architectures are now
implementable due to software defined networking (SDN) as
we demonstrated recently in [28].
The proposed Internet access and routing decisions can be
supported either by distributed scheduling and routing algo-
rithms that were proposed for ad hoc and mesh networks [25],
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[26], if we assume that the devices can operate in a perfectly
synchronous fashion (e.g., employing a TDM MAC protocol
[32]), or they can be implemented by the typical CSMA/CA
protocol which does not require tight synchronization. How-
ever, there might be a gap between the theoretical performance
studied in this paper and the practical implementation of such
schemes, which we intent to analyze in our future works.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
User-provided networks take advantage of the technical
capabilities of handheld user-owned devices; and connect
different and possibly heterogeneous networks in a bottom up
fashion. This constitutes a paradigm shift with the potential
to increase the effective capacity of wireless networks by
unleashing dormant network resources. One of the main chal-
lenges in UPNs is to incentivize the participation of users, on
the basis of a fair resource contribution and capacity allocation.
In this work, we proposed an optimization framework which
maximizes the UPN efficiency, and allocates the produced
capacity in a fair fashion. The mechanism is amenable to
distributed implementation, and is lightweight in terms of
communication overheads. We verified numerically that the
system ensures a higher performance than the independent
operation of the nodes, and that the UPN benefits increase
when users have more diverse needs and/or resources.
Interestingly, the proposed framework constitutes a method
for unifying energy and monetary costs, based on the users’
needs and demands, and enables the monetization of the
technical capabilities of user devices. Unlike other coopera-
tive mechanisms that rely on auctions or centralized pricing
schemes, this bargaining-based solution is self-enforcing and
can be implemented in a decentralized fashion. Furthermore,
the proposed framework involves interactions only between
one-hop neighbors. Besides, it was made clear in the analysis
that UPNs extend the offloading architectures by enabling on-
loading traffic from Wi-Fi to cellular networks, hence provide
a flexible solution for addressing the increasing interference
and collision problem in the ISM band.
Finally, it worths mentioning that our approach is motivated
by the concept of collaborative consumption, which promotes
business models and systems for sharing resources. The term
was introduced in 1978 by Felson [59] and has been recently
revisited in a comprehensive fashion [60]. Interestingly, several
innovative startups [13], [12], [14], have recently introduced
respective services for mobile users. Besides, recent measure-
ment studies have reveled the potential gains of mobile user
collaboration in cellular networks [17], which can nowadays
be implemented due to recent technological advancements in
wireless networking [6], [27], [28], [47].
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